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TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
CHALLENGE TO THE GATT/WTO
PRINCIPLE OF "EVER-FREER TRADE"
SARA DILLON*

INTRODUCTION

Free trade advocates, long comfortable with their insular understanding of the functioning of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT"),1 finally are showing intellectual unease over
increased opposition to free trade principles by environmentalists.
The amount of scholarly output on this issue has come to constitute a specialized niche. The great majority of commentators on
trade and the environment, being supporters of ever-freer trade,
appear determined to preclude arguments arising from an incipient popular opposition to the established GATT principles. Historically, the changeover from GATT to the more institutionally
coherent World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 1995 coincides
with the consolidation of a "Single Market" in the European
Union.2 As a result of years of GATT negotiations, a far more ambitious system of international trade regulation has been created.
This system has important conceptual parallels to the growing in* Ms. Dillon is on the Faculty of Law at University College Dublin, Ireland, where she
lectures on International Trade Law and Environmental Law. J.D., Columbia University
School of Law, 1993; Ph.D. (Asian Languages), Stanford University, 1988; M.A. (Asian
Languages), Stanford University, 1985; M.A. (English), University of Wisconsin, 1979;
B.A., St. Michael's College in Vermont, 1977. Ms. Dillon is admitted to the New York Bar
and as a member of the Built Environment Group of An Taisce (the National Trust for
Ireland), she is active in the area of building conservation and planning.
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2 See GATT, Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
[hereinafter Uruguay Round Agreement]. The 1995 changes in GATT, through the Uruguay Round Agreements, have introduced an actual World Trade Organization [WTO],
with a Dispute Settlement Body [DSB] having power to compel compliance with panel decisions. See also 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988). Until this change, individual countries could veto
adoption of an adverse panel decision, thus limiting the legal significance of the decision.
Aside from this, a number of new subject areas were brought under GATT discipline with
the Uruguay Round. No longer restricted to issues of free trade in goods, the GATT/WTO is
to oversee the progressive liberalization of trade in services, investments, and agriculture,
and to mandate the harmonization of national intellectual property laws. Id.
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tegrationist ambitions of the European Union, and to the worldwide prominence currently accorded to free trade agreements.
Within this proliferation of trade agreements and customs areas,
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") concluded
by the United States and Canada with Mexico, is arguably the
most rhetorically impressive, yet factually horrific. In particular,
Mexico's situation cries out for an analysis of the gap between the
elaborate legal structure set up to facilitate that country's maximum participation in the world "free trade" system and the startling reality for the majority of affected workers.
The preferred approach by trade law scholars has been to employ the existing GATT/WTO principles to demonstrate that all
sides can sit down and reason together, provided that the terms of
the discussion can be made to coincide with the existing GATT
framework. For trade scholars long accustomed to a world in
which GATT has monopolized thinking about trade regulation,
the instinctive reaction to criticism is to seek a solution under the
auspices of the GATT framework. The fundamental argument of
these scholars is that free trade and environmental considerations
can easily co-exist, and that trade "protection," or, worse still,
economies organized in an other than export-driven direction, will
cause, rather than defend against, environmental degradation.
A 1992 GATT Secretariat report provides official support for the
notion that increased trade liberalization within the GATT framework alone will generate the sort of "wealth" which might allow
environmentally friendly production methods to be implemented
by trading nations.3 This report was published one year after the
notorious Tuna-Dolphin decision, 4 a case which was a wake-up
3 GATT Secretariat, Trade and Environment Report 3 (1992). The report is known for
the forceful intransigence of its tone, as the GATT Secretariat denied that there is any
necessary conflict between the trade regime and protection of the global environment. Id.
Indeed, the report provided trade scholars and business groups with the peculiar, yet popular argument that only more trade can generate the wealth, in the form of a greater national income that can allow poorer countries to spend more on environmental protection
measures. Id. Clearly, the Secretariat accepts as fact that trade alone creates wealth, and
that whatever harm is done to the environment through production for export is not a
central concern. Id.
4 See General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
United States Restrictionson Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted
in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin case]. In this case, Mexico challenged
the United States Marine Mammal Protection Act at the GATT after the United States
banned the sale of Mexican tuna caught with net technology that resulted in dolphin
deaths of a number in excess of the United States statutory limit. Id. at 1602. Mexico
claimed that its right to sell tuna in the United States had been violated by the United
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call to the international environmental movement and has triggered continuous debate between free trade proponents and environmental critics of the GATT. The GATT position which holds
that only more growth-generated wealth can protect the environment is both disingenuous and unprovable; nonetheless, it is constantly repeated at conferences and in articles on the subject.
The reasoning behind this GATT/WTO position is that "pretechnological" societies are the most serious threats to the environment, both in their subsistence-level economic activities and in
their desperate drive to emulate the industrialized western world.
Therefore, it follows that only when these societies have reached a
level of development comparable to the industrial Western nations
will the earth as a whole acquire sufficient "wealth" for environmental cleanup. A parallel theory is that people in poorer countries will only become truly interested in environmental matters
when they have managed to "progress" via free trade, which is the
only vehicle posited for the achievement of such progress at the
purportedly high level attained in industrialized nations.
However, given the peculiar historical confluence of what environmentalists perceive as environmental crisis, along with the
adoption of the GATT's Uruguay Round Agreements and the creation of the WTO as of 1995, 5 there is the possibility that the underlying assumptions of GATT theory will be challenged successfully for the first time since World War II. Given the enormous
influence of those principles on the structure of economies worldwide, a small but vocal set of critics are questioning the results of
the Uruguay Round in an effort to determine whether or not
States embargo. Id. A GATT panel agreed, and declared the United States legislation
GATT-illegal. Id. The most controversial aspects of the panel's decision were the following
findings: (i) GATs Article III national treatment requirements do not allow trade measures to be based on production methods, as in the Tuna-Dolphin case, the type of net used
to catch tuna, but only on the products themselves; and (ii) the United States could only
invoke a GATT Article XX exception for the conservation of natural resources if the resources were located in United States territory. Id. at 846. The panel found the United
States restrictive action to be both unilateral and extraterritorial, and thus, GATT-illegal.
Id.; see also GATT, supra note 1, art. XX; Janet McDonald, Greeningthe GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397,
412 (1993) (discussing validity of environmental protection measures after Tuna-Dolphin);
David J. Ross, Note, Making GATT Dolphin-Safe: Trade and the Environment, 2 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 351 (1992) (discussing decision concluding that U.S. tuna import
restrictions are contrary to certain GATT provisions). See generally Thomas Skilton, Note,
GATT and the Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an
InternationalConservation Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 455 (1993).
5 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing introduction and change to WTO
in 1995).
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GATT principles are adequate or legal, raising fundamental challenges to the truisms of free trade doctrine. Most mainstream
commentators, however, are determined to ensure that the parameters of this discussion will coincide with classical GATT principles, thus shifting the evidentiary burden with respect to the validity of the new free trade agreements to the environmental
critics of the GATT/WTO system.
This paper will argue that the GATT/WTO system as currently
conceived, along with NAFTA and other integrationist trading
blocs, may well have exceeded the optimum outer boundary for
international trade relations. This paper will further argue that a
system based on a theory of ongoing and potentially unlimited
trade liberalization itself impedes the evaluation of whether one
has passed a point where further integration of one's economy into
the global system ceases to be beneficial.
It may well be that free trade has an important role to play in
economic development, as long as it is responsive to local differences and allows local populations to approve the method of implementation. Surely, though, the retention of benefits brought
about by international trade depends upon a global trade system
which is constructed to meet these same nuances of regional, cultural, or national significance. The analytical test for evaluating
the validity of trade regulation must be based on an objective, independently derived sense of what level of prosperity and security
is or is not being delivered to most people. Such an approach to
evaluating the world trade regime would help us to prevent the
GATT/WTO establishment and their allies in national governments from ignoring such potential results as widespread loss of
meaningful employment, destruction of traditional culture, and
environments continually altered beyond recognition by "progress." Many developing nations in particular restrict vital public
expenditure in favor of lean, internationally competitive models. 6
As conventionally articulated, the looming issue faced by the
world trading regime is two-fold. First, there presently exists no
clear means by which the current trade regime can respond to actions of national governments which have as their objective the
6 In recent months, books and articles have begun to appear which refute the myth that
people in developing countries do not mind environmental degradation. See, e.g., MADHAU
GADGEL & R. GuHA,ECOLOGY & EQurry: THE USE AND ABUSE OF NATURE IN CONTEMPORARY
INDIA

(1996).
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protection of the environment, but also have negative implications
for free trade. Second, the GATT/WTO must be reformed to display "sensitivity" to environmental issues on an ongoing basis,
thus enhancing the GATT's comprehensiveness and credibility.
The defenders of the ever-freer trading order see this as the general outline of their dilemma. This paper argues that there is another dimension to the problem, in that by its nature ever-expanding international trade is accelerating the degradation of our
global environment as a whole, and thus cannot be made environmentally benign through minor doctrinal adjustments. The
GATT/WTO system must not be "reformed" so as to include "environmental considerations" until this question is examined with
the seriousness and concreteness it deserves.
It is entirely indefensible for so many trade law scholars to take
the core GATT principles as a consensus starting point in this vitally important debate. Fifty years into the creation of our global
trading system, any evaluation of the overall benefits of international trade ought by rights to take into account relative inequalities in the distribution of wealth and the relative stability of the
conditions of life for most people in the countless regions where
the effects of "ever-freer trade" are being felt. Until recently, there
has been no widespread public debate on whether world trade was
creating the sort of stable climate that might be conducive to ordinary human happiness.
Part I of this article will first discuss if and how the GATT can
be considered "law" at all, and second, why there exist grounds for
doubting that the GATT should be considered law. Part II will
discuss the fundamental terms in the "trade and the environment"
debate. Part III questions the logic of the response offered by
economists to criticism of the effects of free trade. Part IV will
present a survey of substantive challenges to GATT/WTO doctrine
by those opposed to the legal authority accorded to the GATT system. Parts V and VI will provide a critical discussion of suggestions put forward by trade scholars with respect to the possible
creation of a global environmental organisation to parallel the
GATT, and will present an argument as to why this must not be
allowed to occur.
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GATT As "LAW"

It is difficult to explain in familiar jurisprudential terms
whether the GATT is indeed "law" in any recognizable sense. Because of its unambiguously economic basis, the GATT/WTO cannot neatly be analogized with other types of treaties, nor readily
inserted in any category of "international law." The question as to
whether the GATT is truly "law" is not merely a technical issue.
Rather, the legal validity of the GATT/WTO ethos must at long
last be tested against the views of people whose lives are directly
affected by trade. The GATT has lacked the institutional trappings, the constitutional architecture, and the broadly disseminated theoretical justifications which are all typically associated
with legal systems. The GATT/WTO system has expanded in the
shadows, far removed from public perception. Ever freer trade is
accepted as a necessity, despite the fact that its ultimate source of
7
legal authority remains cloudy.
The principles of GATT have been presented to the public in
various countries as a naturally derived law, the authority of
which rests upon some indefinable essence of historically sanctioned economic wisdom." The few available early textbooks, introductory articles, and commentary on the GATT generally devote
some pages to its "theoretical underpinnings," most commonly a
stylized and simplified version of the doctrine of comparative advantage.9 Comparative advantage almost always is set out in an
7 See GATI, supra note 1, at 81.
8 See Note, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and The
Promise of Development, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1715, 1717-21 (1995) [hereinafter Developing
Countries] (describing progressionist international legal theory as moving towards interdependency under GATT and WTO and offering historical perspective and development of
international trade law); see also JOAN E. SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMC RELATIONS 69 (4th ed. 1990) (arguing that market driven capitalism will lead to
stronger growth and better environmental conditions). See generally JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT 330 (1969).
9 See Kele Onyejekwe, InternationalLaw of Trade Preferences: Emanationsfrom The
European Union and The United States, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 425, 445 (1995) (defining comparative advantage as states generate more wealth by specializing in production of what
they produce best); see also G. Richard Snell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization,44 Durua L.J. 829, 904 (1995). The
author defines the doctrine of comparative advantage as "global wealth increases if each
state specializes in producing and exporting those goods and services that it is most efficient at producing." Id. (citing JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTUmING THE GATT SYSTEM 5
(1990)). The author further posits that "specialization occurs most efficiently through open,
competitive markets that accurately price goods and services, enabling the producers in
each country to discover what they are comparatively good at producing." Id. See generally
Susan Strange, Protectionismand World Politics, 39 INT'L ORG. 233, 238 (1985). The author
states that [lliberal economists believe that the individual pursuit of private gain is consis-
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intellectually superficial manner, which fails to explain adequately why the GATT should retain its status as the undisputed
forum for world trade relations.
Certain "model" free trade countries are used as exemplars, and
all adverse effects of free trade are said to be ameliorable by an
increasingly rigorous application of those same policies. 10 The
greatest flaw in multinational accords, such as the GATT, is that
the subtleties and requirements of local economies, whether in a
particular nation or a national sub-region, are overlooked. When
this is pointed out by critics, policy makers respond only by reference to the aggregate notional gains of present free trade policy.
For the GATT to be accorded the status of "law," it should have to
pass a difficult test as to whether or not it is delivering economic
democracy. Properly understood, the GATT/WTO is no more than
one choice among several possible policy choices which could guide
the organisation of world trade relations. Nearly all supranational and multilateral "legal" constructs of recent decades have
been presented as monoliths to those citizens who will be affected.
A state must acquiesce to all of its relevant terms or face exclusion
and possible economic hardships as a result. Citizens are not free
to pick and choose among sub-policies because, according to free
trade advocates, that would apparently make it too difficult to renegotiate terms, or would "distort" the free flow of goods and
capital.
Frequently, the likely causes of increased unemployment and
environmental degradation and the "hollowing out" of economic
activity as nations are forced by the pressures of competition to
specialize are ironically presented as the only possible solutions to
tent with the general welfare of society, since the hidden hand of the market ensures that
the producer will make what the consumer wants.., the world economy will be well served
if each individual government or state observes the law of comparative costs and sells on
the market what it produces best." Id.
10 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN

GATT

LEGAL SYSTEM

25 (Butterworth Leg. Pub., 1993). The author observes that

this is another version of the "bicycle theory" of free trade. Id. At times when the anti-trade
constituencies in a given country, often led by the labor movement, seem to be growing
larger and more vocal, the government's response is that only more free trade will solve
economic problems, although the problems being complained of have apparently often been
caused by free trade. Id. The author writes in the United States in the 1970's '[the number
of domestic political complaints about economic losses from import competition was increasing. The way to offset these complaints, the Nixon Administration concluded, was to
promise greater overall economic gains from new trade liberalization. This is sometimes
called 'the bicycle theory' of trade politics: like a bicycle, trade liberalization must be kept
moving forward or else it will fall over." Id. at 25.
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these same problems. This leads to the conclusion that if "everfreer trade" harms the environment, then only more trade can
heal it; the result of such logic is that the overall policy cannot
meaningfully be opposed. Trading blocs like the European Union
and the more truly global GATT/WTO have invested a great deal
in creating the image of a "consumer" who can somehow be detached from a more complex and fully integrated citizen, one who
works, feels, and desires within the context of culture and a natural environment.
Legally speaking, the GATT is built on a handful of relatively
inane principles, which have been as successful as they have because of their consistency and simplicity. But the real genius of
the GATT has in fact been its gradualism. As with all trading
empires of recent times, the GATT accomplishes its objectives by
drawing together cross-border economic interests, especially those
of corporations with global reach, and it works by diminishing the
prominence of place and trumpeting a constructed sense of international "sectors."
On its face, the GATT is saturated with loopholes and exceptions. Perhaps the main reason why the GATT is not perceived by
many non-specialists as "law" is precisely because it reads like a
permissive mass of opt-outs, while its "commandments" come off
as correspondingly vague and half-hearted. Certainly, compared
with the authoritarian flourishes of the European Union's unmistakably legal edifice, the GATT/WTO is sadly lacking in credibly
articulated assertions of power.' 1 However, until the 1995 institutional clarifications, the GATT had been all the more effective for
this camouflage. The creation of the WTO may bring the GATT
system out into the open for analysis, although these systemic
11 See International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R.
1219, 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (Holland). The Court of Justice of the European Communities refused to
give GATT direct effect within the European legal system, meaning that no rights were
conferred upon individuals by the GATT provisions which they could invoke in European
national courts. Id. at 1226, 2 C.M.L.R. at 52. The European of Justice cited the fact that

the General Agreement:
is based on the principle of negotiations undertaken on the basis of 'reciprocal and

mutually advantageous arrangements' [and] is characterised by the great flexibility of
its provisions, in particular those conferring the possibility of derogation, the measures

to be taken when confronted with exceptional difficulties and the settlement of conflicts
between the contracting parties.
Id. at 1227. The court was clearly contrasting the General Agreement's lack of "legalism"
with the European legal regime, which enjoys full coercive powers. As of the 1995 reforms

in the GATT/WTO, at least in some respects this characterization of the GATT system
would seem to be outdated.
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changes are conceptually opaque enough to prevent discussion
from moving beyond a comparatively specialized clique. The
GATT/WTO is immensely influential because it represents an outwardly "flexible" but paradoxically iron-clad determination on the
part of the world's largest trading nations, whose governments
have fallen increasingly under the influence of the largest corporations, that "ever-freer trade" is the best means for delivering economic benefits to the most powerful interests within those
nations.
The GATT/WTO is virtually never presented honestly as the international convenience for national governments that it is, relieving policy makers of the burden of explanation and justification
which would inevitably accompany similar economic decisions
taken at a national level. Rather, the GATT/WTO is presented as
a "best-hope" set of transcendent principles, where national "self
interest" is subsumed in the greater good of the world's people.
This is a technique identical to that employed by the architects of
economic empires everywhere, including those of the European
Union's Single Market. However, whereas the European Union
has opted for legalistic fanfare, GATT traditionally has relied
upon a startlingly effective combination of secrecy and quiet persistence. Surely if GATT is "law," then it must be examined more
critically and by a wider spectrum of the public. If it is not exactly
"law" then we need not accept the authoritarian 1995 reforms, nor
any other version of legalistic coercion when it comes to international trade policy, and especially not when it comes to the effects
of unlimited international trade on the global environment.

II. GATT SCHOLARS: A

NERVOUS RESPONSE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL CRITICS

Based upon the magnitude of books and articles on the GATT
and the environment, one cannot help but be struck by the inadequate, clumsy feel of GATT principles as they are used in the service of defending the global trading system against charges that it
encourages environmental degradation. The facile notion of "comparative advantage" which lies at the heart of all other GATT doctrines will not suffice in a complex discussion of issues such as the
third world debt crisis or whether liberalized trade in services and
investments ought in fact to be approached in the same way as
was trade in goods. Assuming a reasonably democratic political
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context, most national-level changes in any legal regime are expected to be accompanied by adequate public discussion of the effect on real people of such changes. Consultation of this sort occurs less frequently at the supranational level. In the European
Union, for example, voters are presented with a far more monolithic all-or-nothing package than they would ever have to accept
or reject at the national level, and public consultation on effects is
something which is lacking almost entirely at the multilateral or
global level, as in the GATT.
This absence of public discussion is especially unfortunate since
people everywhere are increasingly affected in the most dramatic
and drastic ways by economic events and forces outside their national borders-well out of the hands of national policy makers.
Now, for the first time since the end of World War II, it appears
that the GATT is being forced to explain itself, including the
source of its legal authority. One might have expected more by
way of self-justification from a theory which has dominated economic arrangements around the world for fifty years.
III.

THE

SUBSTANCE OF THE TRADE AND THE

ENVIRONMENT DEBATE

It is not possible for free traders to dismiss out of hand the criticisms of the environmental movement. Historically, it has by
comparison been simpler for them to disregard "socialists" or "protectionists," for example. Indeed, the strongest advocates of everexpanding trade are most ardent to depict the GATT as a faithful
friend of the earth. Since the WTO seeks nothing less than a pristine environment, they insist, there should be no serious conflict
between increased global trade and conservation of the environment. A highly questionable element in this argument is that the
contemporary Western standard of environmental health and protection is high, and will improve further with "new technologies."
It is assumed this will occur when the idealized consumers are
able to exercise "free choice" (vote with their feet), and make it
economically sound business for industry to invest even more in
environmentally improved goods.
One glaring contradiction in this argument is the fact that the
contemporary Western standard of environmental protection is
not high, but rather abysmal. In industrialized countries, the supposedly all-powerful consumers have killed off local nature
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through their economic behavior in many localities, and are awash
in appalling structures, consisting of over-built motor ways, noisy,
polluting vehicles, and vast mountains of waste. Thus, trade
scholars are simply comparing Western environmental legislation
with developing world environmental laws, which are more inadequate still, and are arguing that the developed world has a "high"
standard of environmental protection.
The free trade establishment would have us believe it is a fallacy that free trade will harm the environment, since free trade is
aimed at efficiency and economic growth.12 As an initial matter, it
is claimed that whether growth is more accurately linked with the
improvement of the environment or with its degradation simply
cannot be stated with confidence. 13 What can be stated, they
maintain, is that increased income per capita will allow countries
to pay for pollution control and, besides, there is more "organized
activity for environmental causes" in richer countries than in
poorer ones,1 4 an idea endorsed by the GATT Secretariat itself.
Completely ignoring the fact that as nations prepare for increased global competition, GATT-style free trade has pushed millions of people out of traditional occupations, off the land, and into
the cities, mainstream commentators on the subject offer as their
example of "protectionism pollutes" a system like the European
Union's Common Agricultural Policy, which has encouraged disastrously intensive farming methods. These writers often serve up
such false opposites. The Common Agricultural Policy is a highly
specific system; although both environmentally unsound and protectionist, it is only one manifestation of the worldwide pursuit of
unsustainable intensive farming methods. Its eventual disappearance is no guarantee that intensive farming will likewise be
terminated.
Despite the fact that most critics of the ill effects of total free
trade indisputably are concerned about the fate of the people in
the developing world, others who refuse to imagine any but a
12

See Jadish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?, in TRADE

AND

THE ENVuRoNmENT: LAw, ECONOMCS, AND POLICY 159 (Zaelke et al. eds., 1993) (discussing

theory of potential harm to environment by unrestrained free trade).
13 See id. at 163. Mr. Bhagwati writes that "[olne may well find that specific types of
But nothing general could be asserted for
pollution fall as per capita incomes rise ....
pollution of all kinds, obviously. Growth can then be asserted to be tightly linked neither to
the improvement of the environment nor with its degradation." Id.
14 See id. at 162.
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globalizing project turn such concerns to their own advantage by
raising the spectre of third world resentment against the supposed arrogance and "eco-imperialism" of First World Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs"). The implication is that the
NGOs are attempting to hold these poor countries back from taking their fair share of the world's resources.'- Oddly, most mainstream commentators on international trade have not for their
part acknowledged the simultaneous spread of poverty along with
free trade/global interdependence across the world; notably but
far from solely in the third world, even in many countries lauded
for their efforts to "open their markets."' 6 Nor have they recognized the relationship between GATT doctrine and the grueling,
and seemingly interminable, debt crisis.' 7 If such commentators
are sincerely attempting to "protect" the developing world from
the eco-imperialists, one is certainly entitled to ask why so little
concern has been demonstrated over the fact that open door trade
policies in the developing world, especially since the debt crisis,
have failed to deliver the across-the-board prosperity GATT advo-

15 See Bhagwati, supra note 12, at 170-71. The author asserts the following:
The moral militancy that motivates some of the environmental NGOs seeking unilaterally imposed sanctions on others who do not share their particular preferences or 'values' has begun to turn off even other NGOs, especially in the poor countries that see
"eco-imperialism" when the strong nations use trade power to force their preferred values on the weaker nations. The equally autonomous values of the weaker nations, however, cannot be forced upon the stronger nations in the same ways. NGOs of the poor
countries deny that the NGOs of the strong nations have a monopoly on virtue. And
some charge hypocrisy when they see asymmetrical efforts by these latter NGOs at
home and abroad even on broadly shared values. Why, they ask, is the US-based
global-warming conscious Greenpeace agitating about rain forests in the poor countries instead of concentrating on raising US gas prices to international levels?
Id. However, Mr. Bhagwati neither offers a survey of what the "poor country" NGOs have
to say on the question of the world trading order as a system nor on the American or European-based activities of Greenpeace.
16 See Keith Schneider, Balancing Natures' Claims and InternationalFree Trade, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1992, at E5 (claiming that forcing less developed nations to bring environmental laws to higher level could lead to more poverty); see also Nicholas Timmins, Summit Gives PoorMore Hope than Help, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 11, 1995, at 11 (reporting on United Nations' first social summit and noting that most of world's 1.3 billion poor
reside in developing nations); Kevin Watkins, Under GATT Deal, The Poor Will Be Even
Poorer,MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 1993, at B4 (asserting that GATT will benefit industrial countries but will send world's poorest countries into future of worsening poverty).
17 See Stuart Auerbach, Link Between Debt Crisis, Trade Grows, WASH. POST, Sept. 28,
1986, at HO. The author quoted the then chairman of the GATI conference, Enriques
Iglesias, as stating that "[tihe debt crisis is coming more and more to be a trade crisis. The
link between trade and debt is crucial.. ."Id.; see also Watkins, supra note 16, at B4 (stating that distribution of benefits to industrial countries and powerful multinational companies as result of GATT fails to address debt problems faced by poorer countries).
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cates always have insisted would ensue.1 8 One has a moral responsibility to question the willingness of many GATT scholars to
accept Gross National Product ("GNP") and Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") as adequate measures of the material security of most
people, despite the fact that these measures in themselves tell us
little about the way the majority of working people live. 19
Without explaining their own insistence on the idea that states
must "harmonize" with regard to intellectual property law, 20 economists nevertheless object to the purported demand of environmentalists and labor activists that there be harmonization in the
areas of environmental protection and labor standards. 2 1 The
economists say that, after all, nations are not the same and that
comparative advantage must be allowed to exercise its natural influence.2 2 If one presents compelling ideas in the moral or ethical
realm (culture, environment and economic democracy), the free
trade argument continues, those ideas will spread by virtue of
their own persuasive qualities because they are seen to be right,
whereas the "use of state power in the shape of trade sanctions to
18 See David Nicholson-Lord, Civilisationfor Sale, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 12, 1993,
availablein WESTLAW, 1993 WL 10900099 (asserting that free trade under GAIT will not
provide benefits uniformly to rich and poor, and financial gains from GATT will exacerbate
existing economic inequalities). Contrary to the assertions of the supporters of the Uruguay
Round agreement, the GATT will not generate windfalls for developing countries. Watkins,
supra note 16, at B4. The author further argues that, in fact, economic estimates indicate
that less than one-third of income gains under GATT will go to the south, and a much
larger portion will be absorbed by the European Community, United States, and Japan. Id.
19 See, e.g., Development: GNP Seen as Inadequate Measure of Economies, INTER PRESS
SERV., May 12, 1993, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 2541097 (reporting that prominent
economist Hazel Henderson supports replacement of Gross National Product with indicators which take into account social, environmental, and other factors besides transactions
with only monetary value); see also Kele Onyejekwe, GATT Agriculture, and Developing
Countries, 17 HAMLINe L. REV. 77, 152 (1993) (contending that use of Gross National Product as measure of prosperity is criticized widely because such statistics ignore quality of life
of people).
20 See Paul Demonet, The Metamorphosesof the GATT: From the Havana Charterto the
World Trade Organization,34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 162 (1995) (noting that "largest and most ambitious" attempt to harmonize intellectual property rights has taken place
under WTO).
21 See Michael H. Shuman, GATTzilla v. Communities, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 527, 541
(1994) (suggesting that trade agreements such as GATT"would better serve communities by
requiring minimum standards for worker rights as well as environmental protection); see
also Geoffrey W. Levin, Note, The Environment and Trade - A MultilateralImperative, 1
MINN. J. OF GLOBAL TRADE 231, 233-42 (1992) (stating that labor rights and environmental
protection both emanate from societal concerns and from economic concerns).
22 See Stephen Fleischer, Note, The Mexico-U.S. Tuna/Dolphin Dispute in GATT: Exploring the Use of Trade Restrictionsto Enforce EnvironmentalStandards,3 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 515, 524-25 (1993).
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force others into accepting one's own idiosyncratic choice of ethical
concerns seems wholly inappropriate."23
However, this sort of coercion is precisely what has taken place
with the reforms of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the
WTO. 24 For example, India and Argentina have voiced strong ethical objections to the adoption of the Agreement on Trade - Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs")2 5 because it
changes their intellectual property laws in a manner which will
raise the price of drugs and agricultural products, making such
products less accessible to the poor.26 Yet most GATT scholars appear to take no issue with GATT coercion in the name of "protecting" intellectual property rights.2 7 When recalling the notorious
Tuna-Dolphincase, it is striking to see the ruffled feathers on display in the commentary of free trade advocates over the United
States' attempt to legislate production "process," as opposed to the
GATT's focus on final "product."28 This seems quite inconsistent
with the fact that these same scholars had no apparent difficulty
See Bhagwati, supra note 12, at 170.
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994); Multinational Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multinational Trade Organization [World
Trade Organization], Dec. 13, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
25 See Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec.
15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
26 See Intellectual Property... is Theft. (Trade Related Intellectual Property Regulations), ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1994, at 72 (noting that, in India, opponents of TRIPs argue
that products to which patents are granted significantly raise their prices, and if TRIPs
rules were enforced in India, most local manufacturers would be forced out of business by
monopolizing inventors); see also Peter Truell, Fair Exchange: Trade Talks are Key for
Many U.S. Firms,and They're Worried, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1990, at Al (stating that developing countries complain that drug pirating is only way they can meet health needs of their
citizens at affordable prices). The author quotes Pablo Challu, the head of the Argentine
drug manufacturers' association, as stating that United States encouragement of intellectual property protection "would pave the way for dramatic price increases" in Argentina
and would "bankrupt the health care system." Id.
27 See Jean M. Dettman, GATT: An Opportunityfor an Intellectual PropertyRights Solu23
24

tion, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 347, 361-62 (1991) (arguing that GATT is appropriate forum

through which to institute intellectual property protection); see also Michael L. Doane,
TRIPs and InternationalIntellectual PropertyProtection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 484 (1994) (noting GATIs significance in continued
development of intellectual property law).
2 See Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23
ENVTL. L. 475, 475-80 (1993) (analyzing conflict between goals of environmental protection
and rules promulgated by GATT and noting that GATT panel report resulting from Tuna.
Dolphin Dispute sent shock waves through international environmental community); see
also Stephen J. Porter, Note, The Tuna/Dolphin Controversy: Can the GATT Become Environment-Friendly?,5 GEo. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 91, 92 (1992) (arguing that GATT should be
changed to provide for trade sanctions which would advance environmental concerns).
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with the sweeping GATT reforms of intellectual property protection, concerning which it is undeniable that intellectual property
matters concentrate squarely on process only.2 9
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the environmental argument adopted by free trade advocates is that calls by NGOs and
others for real action to prevent further harm to the global environment is presented as a mere cultural peculiarity, just one
quirky aspect of the "value system" of the rich Western countries.3 0 The central reason why poor countries have designed their
29

See Steve Charnovitz, EnvironmentalHarmonizationand Trade Policy, in TRADE AND

THE ENVIRoNMENT: LAw, ECONOMICS AND POLICY 267. Mr. Charnovitz writes that:

It is inconsistent for GATT to maintain that process standards are acceptable for certain cases (like copyrights) and forbidden for others (like marine mammals). Countries
need to be able to impose process standards in order to encourage international cooperation where nations cannot achieve their goals in isolation.... While trade controls are not essential to collective action, they are a readily available and reliable tool
to encourage co-operation and discourage free riding.
Id. at 271.
3O See generally John Jackson, Greening the GATT: Trade Rules and Environment Policy, in TRADE AND THE ENmormENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 39-44 (Cameron et al. eds.,
1994). The author has adopted an approach that characterizes the clash between environmentalists and free traders as one of "cultures." Id. Obviously, by framing the issue in this
way, Mr. Jackson is able to show that the two sides can be reasonably accommodated, that
mutual "understanding" is the key, and that compromise is eminently possible. Id. The
author's argument also cleverly removes the focus from the "values" of multinational corporations and attributes relative indifference to the environment to third world people. Mr.
Jackson is eager to show that this debate represents primarily a "challenge to the trading
system as we have known it since the end of World War II," an indication of the seriousness
with which the environmental issue is seen by mainstream free trade supporters. Id. at 40.
He advocates an "accommodation," and seeks to discredit at the outset one of the most
significant points raised by environmental critics of the GATT; that endlessly encouraging
economic activity at the global level is both seriously harmful to the environment as well as
economically unnecessary. Id. In this vein, Mr. Jackson writes the following:
Some environmental advocates have argued, or appeared to argue, that increased
trade among nations may itself (by its mere existence) cause environmental damage.
Trade might, for example, create economic incentives to mis-use farm land, or to cut
down rain forests. On the other hand, some economists have argued that trade will
enhance the economic well-being of poor nations to the point where the citizens there
will express preference for and be able to afford environmental improvement.
Id. at 41. Furthermore, Mr. Jackson goes so far as to make a parody out of national-level
attempts to set high environmental standards regarding the process leading to the creation
of products which are to be imported from abroad, in a kind of humorous take-off on the
United States position in the Tuna-Dolphin case. The author writes as follows:
For an importing country to prohibit import of autos because the plant abroad in which
it was produced has equipment dangerous to humans, even though the importing country prohibits domestic production with that danger, opens up the risk of GATT allowing potential import restrictions based on thousands of societal and economic characteristics of the exporting nation; for example:
Low wages
Mixing women and men on the assembly line
Smoking in the plant
Sunday operation or night operation
Failure to provide prayer breaks
Failure to provide background music (or noise earmuffs)
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economies around exports in recent years surely is to generate the
requisite amount of foreign exchange to service their massive
debts. Also, developing countries tend to be caught up in the
world trading system as primary commodity producers, a very uncertain position and a status from which they dream of escaping
through rapid industrialization. 1
Closely related to this phenomenon of fashioning third world
country exports to generate foreign exchange has been the World
Bank's well-publicized program of structural adjustment. Under
the program, an export-driven economy is established, quid pro
quo, for receiving any further financial assistance from the Bank,
and by extension from other lending institutions that take their
cue from the Bank.3 2 To imply that the sole or even the principal
reason that poor countries have arranged their economies as they
have is to create prosperity for most citizens without reference to
either the unrepresentative nature of many regimes, or to the
stark inequality that holds sway in many "model" free trade nations, or to the debt crisis, certainly represents an intellectually
ineffective attempt to stave off important questions raised as to
the adequacy, or even the simple accuracy, of basic GATT
doctrine.
Plants owned by foreign interests
Diversity requirements (sex, religion, race)
Housing not supplied to workers.
Id. at 44.
Apart from Mr. Jackson's rather transparent attempt to trivialize the issue of environmental objections to trade in certain products, whether because of the inherent danger of
the product itself, or because of some condition relating to production of the product considered intolerable by the importing country, he also is apparently implying by his list that
racial discrimination against workers, for example, is not one of the factors an importing
country should legitimately take into account-a strange argument indeed, considering the
recently experienced virtual world consensus on the importance of not pursuing trade links
with South Africa.
31 See Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the InternationalTrade Order, 14 N.
ILL. U. L. Rav. 347, 359 (1994) (noting that developing countries traditionally have been
concerned with primary commodities); see also Bradley K Boyd, Note, The Development of
a Global Market-BasedDebt Strategy to Regulate PrivateLending to Developing Countries,
18 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 461, 471 (1988) (maintaining that developing countries generally
depend on commodity exports as their primary source of foreign exchange).
32 See Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America:
Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. IN'L L.
221, 223 (1994) (maintaining that World Bank's policy-based lending focused on measures
that would improve supply and prevent recurrence of financial crisis); see also Ibrahim I.
Shihata, The World Bank Facing the 21st Century - Developments in the 1980's and Prospects for the 1990's, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTER-

NATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS 83, 86 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 3d ed. 1994) (describing
Bank's introduction of structural adjustments loans in 1980 wherein financing to poorer
countries was preconditioned on those countries' reforming their economies).
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The Economist Holds the Floor

Just as traditional GATT/WTO scholars are trying their best to
retain control of the debate with environmentalists by referring
all conflicts back to fundamental GATT principles, the economists
are being called into service to prevent any alternative notions
from discrediting the few rather simplistic concepts upon which
the entire GATT/WTO edifice rests. The economist's task is to ensure that ordinary thinking people continue to accept the assumptions central to the bicycle theory of trade;33 if some trade is good,
more must be better. Under such a theory, economic welfare must
be examined in the aggregate and without regard to such distinctions as separate cultures,
distribution of wealth, or unique sys34
tems of local exchange.
The authoritative economist establishes right from the outset
that free trade is a good thing, and that the system of trade must
exist as it is, and must not be doubted. 3 5 The economist insists

that there is an overarching equation, namely that free trade may
generate certain minimal costs, but protection generates inefficiencies and, therefore, more serious costs. The implication is always that a trained lawyer-economist can calculate the balance of
these relative costs. Under this vision, if the costs to the environment are less than the costs which will derive from the inefficiency
created, then the environmental protection measure must lose.3 6
33 See Roberto P. Aponte-Toro, NAFTA One Year Later:Are the Cups Half Empty or Half
Full?, 10 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 571, 575 (1995). The author describes the bicycle theory as a
dilemma where "[e]ither we keep the pressure to constantly liberalize outside markets or
free trade will fall down on its face, just as a bicycle rider when it no longer could pedal the
bicycle." Id.
34 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L.
REV. 4, 69-70 (1994) (noting that economic welfare has long been defined as "aggregate sum
of satisfaction" and increase in such welfare would require any transfer of wealth from rich
to poor to be between groups of similar temperament); see also Whitney Cunningham,
Note, Testing Posner'sStrong Theory of Wealth Maximization, 81 GEo. L.J. 141, 143 (1992)
(arguing that aggregate concept, crucial to wealth maximization, is concerned more with
societal well-being than individual welfare noting that questions of need and desire are not
relevant to economic theory because such judgments require inter-cultural analysis).
35 See David Pearce, The Greening of the GATT: Some Economic Considerations, in
TRADE AND T=E ENVmoNmENT: THm SEARCH FOR BALANCE 20 (James Cameron et al. eds,
1994).
36 See id. at 22. The author states that '[i]f there are environmental costs associated
with free trade, then it is wholly legitimate to offset these against the gains to see what the
net balance is." Id.; see also George D. Holliday, NAFTA: Effects on Trade with Nonmember
Countries, 3 MEX. TRADE & L. REP. 13, 14 (1993). The author notes that the most important
effects of free trade agreements, as asserted by economists, are, interalia: increased competition and stimulation of investment... all positive effects on welfare which far outweigh
negative effects of trade diversion. Id.
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Once again, the attempt here is to prevent any alternative discourse or set of concerns from impinging upon the familiar conclusions of the international trade economist. Destruction of traditional occupations, a degraded environment, and even loss of
community will be counted as "costs" only to the extent that people's willingness to "pay for them" can be assessed.3" Given the
dynamic of modernization, it is difficult to see what resources people caught up in economic forces beyond their control would use to
demonstrate their sense of the "value" attached to such aspects of
life. Economists insist that there is a common denominator that
can be arrived at that allows these costs to be weighed against the
costs which would accrue to the oil companies and the timber
trade should a new, more preservation-oriented approach to economic organization be attempted.38
The advocates of "ever-freer trade" have inhabited a world of
academic abstraction for so long that they appear to imagine that
the GATT verities can never be altered. 39 The recent swirl of arti-

cles and books on the subject of trade and the environment have
as their objective that it should be environmentalists who, having
raised such a cry over the Tuna-Dolphin case, and having made
such dreadful accusations against the GATT/WTO, bear the burden of "proving" their case.40 In a surprisingly interrogationist
manner, given their reactions to the conclusions of their free
trade-oriented colleagues, the same scholars who have insisted
that the developing world is "improving" and "getting richer" in
the face of all evidence to the contrary, are now turning to the
GATT's critics for some hard evidence not only of the suffering
37 See David E. Madeo, Note, Environmental Contaminationand World Trade Integra-

tion: The Case of the Czech Republic, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 945, 945 (1995) (noting
Eastern European communities economic and environmental hardships in entering international trade markets).
38 See Pearce, supra note 35, at 23. Mr. Pearce reiterates that "[ilt is quite feasible for
both free trade and protection to result in environmental degradation. There is no simple
link between freer trade and environmental loss. But even if there is, this loss must be
weighed against the welfare benefits of improved free trade." Id.
39 See generally TIM LANG & COLIN HINES, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: PROTECTING THE
FuTuRE AGAINST FREE TRADE (1993) (pointing out that free traders are as committed to this
abstract idea and as divorced from reality as were old Communist hard liners of Soviet
Union).
40 See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Environment:A MultilateralApproach, 18 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 185, 200 (1994) (asserting that
since international environmental problems invite government regulation of market environmentalists are justified in challenging free traders' assumption that markets are capable of effectively protecting environment).
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wrought by the global trading system, but for evidence that that
suffering "outweighs the benefits" of the "welfare" generated by
free trade, benefits which are by contrast taken as self-evident. 4
As a result, we find mainstream scholars standing convinced on
ideas they take as self-evident, while the critics of GATT/WTO
must bear the burden of proving an environmental case in terms
laid down by the GATT mainstream.42
Not surprisingly, even those commentators who stand out as
somewhat greener as compared with the established GATT scholars, still try to keep their orthodox belief in the benefits of the
GATT/WTO system front and center. Based on the European
Union methodological model, some trade scholars highlight the
need for a more "aspirational" GATT; one that in the manner of
the European Single Market, appends green hopes and dreams to
its larger project, which clearly is about economies of scale and an
increasingly frenetic movement of goods and capital.4 3 Without
questioning the sincerity of the proponents of such a problematic
41 See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA): Good for Jobs, for the Environment, and for America, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
461, 501 (1993) (stating that free trade must be judged according to whether trade creation
outweighs trade diversion).
42 See Pearce, supra note 35, at 34-35. The author argues the following:
[those who advance environmental reasons for restricting international trade have a
difficult assignment. Essentially, they must pass three tests: (1) They must show that
the environmental degradation brought about by free trade is (i) truly brought about
by free trade rather than some other factor and (ii) of greater consequence than the
losses of human well-being that would ensue from restricted trade; (2) they must show
that production-related damage is a legitimate feature of the importing nation's loss of
well-being; (3) they must show that a trade restriction is the most cost-effective way of
bringing about the change in the product or process giving rise to the externality.
Id. Mr. Pearce posits that these are "tough tests," as if the law and economics scholars had
some natural right to set up the hoops for environmental critics to leap through. Id. With
this in mind, it would appear to be an opportune moment to begin asking whether or not
GATT is in fact "law," and by what authority it has come to be seen as such an immutable
set of rules.
The conflict raised by Mr. Pearce could, with at least equal justice, be presented in the
opposite fashion: The free traders must show that the economic welfare said to be brought
about by free trade is (i) truly brought about by free trade rather than by some other factor;
and (ii) of greater consequence than the losses of human well-being that would ensue from
pursuing the current course of economic relations.
Furthermore, Mr. Pearce concludes by stating that "[tihe environmentalists have a case.
I doubt if it is a powerful case, but it needs to be heard." Id. Being heard, one assumes,
refers to this hypothetical "balancing act," in which the environmentalists will be required
to provide the data on degradation inputs which are to be weighed up against the "economic welfare" of free trade as conceived of by the GATT system to date. Id.
43 See, e.g., Note, Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Cowboys: Reconciling
Trade and CulturalIndependence, 4 MNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 165, 178 (1995) (stating that
GATT recognizes that protection of health, natural resources, or national security may justify trade restrictions).
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view, it would seem proper to scrutinize the actual effects of such
aspirational rhetoric. Indeed, its main effect might simply be a
"greening" of the public perception of supranational economic
projects, thereby diverting attention from the environmental degradation which might in fact be the inevitable and natural outcome of all economic empire building. Thus, it seems that from
the content of the burgeoning literature on the subject that trade
scholars are eager for some convenient conceptual marriage of the
GATT and the green in order to prevent any larger questioning of
fundamental GATT doctrine."
New experts in trade-environment "crisis management" primarily want to ensure that the GATT is not eventually seen as inimical to broad-based economic stability and cultural rights. The
GATT is to be "remade" in order to be perceived as an ally of
things green. 45 Above all, the debate over trade and the environment must not to be allowed to break free from the GATT and go
its own way.46
To term measures taken by individual countries to halt trade
in products which may be environmentally destructive Trade44 See Paul Demaret, TREMs, Multilateralism and the GATT, in TRADE AND THE ENViRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 52. Mr. Demaret writes, correctly, that if the GATT is
not "greened," at some point TREMs will continue to be negotiated or unilaterally applied
anyway. Id. In such a case, "the GATT would run the risk of becoming gradually irrelevant
as far as trade-environment debate is concerned." Id. at 65. It may be that appending this
sort of"concern rhetoric" in free trade agreements prevents the most egregious examples of
toxic pollution from being ignored. On the other hand, it is quite irrelevant as far as the
very real adverse effects of huge increases in international trade are concerned; the spreading ugliness (the maquiadora area has been likened to hell on earth); vast increases in
transport traffic; loss of wildlife habitats; loss of local control over retailing;, massive dislocation of workers and attendant cultural upheaval; and huge increases in the use of chemicals and energy. The 'green aspiration" tends to include only the most obvious forms of
"pollution" and to divert attention away from the overall effects free trade agreements have
on the world as most people see, hear, and smell it.
45 See Brown, supra note 31, at 385-89 (pointing out environmentalist concern over
GATT Tuna Panel Decision and noting that narrow reading of GATI's limited provisions
regarding environment suggests that GATT mechanism is unsuited for "greening" international trade order).
46 See Demaret, supra note 44, at 66-67. Mr. Demaret writes that "all GAIT contracting
parties should be invited either to adhere to the major international conventions or to comply with their substantive rules." Id. The author explicitly says that the GATT should learn
from the approach taken by the European Union, which has "greened" its aspirations. Id.
With the deadpan realpolitik characteristic of European Union insiders, Mr. Demaret
writes that, "[iun the future, GATT will have to mix the promotion of free trade and environmental considerations. In that area, it should attempt to become a trusted umpire." Id.
One has only to look at the highly questionable European Union structural funds-related
environmental effects on landscape in member states Ireland, Portugal and Spain, to realize the full irony of Professor Demaret's words.
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Related Environmental Measures "(TREMs"), 47 the "measure" referring to a trade restrictive action taken by a national government for environmental reasons, is to trivialize such national gestures. TREMS are named to echo TRIMs (Trade Related
Investment Measures), which are governmental measures
designed to "restrict trade in investments," specifically to block
undesirable types of inward foreign investment. 4 Naturally, the
implication is that the GATT system is to remain the over-arching
frame of reference with respect to environmental issues.4 9
It would be difficult to imagine a better gift to the multinational
corporate order than the concept of "sustainable development."
Because of its vagueness, sustainable development has fostered
diversionary debates
over what level of "development" is in fact
50
"sustainable."

Even better from the point of view of those who

are being criticised on environmental grounds, the concept has
been propagated by environmentalists themselves, and can thus
be taken as the sum total of "what environmentalists want." Yet
it is silent about a fundamentally altered approach to economic
development or environmental effects of economic activity. "Sustainable development" allows such disparate institutions as the
World Bank and the tiniest local government committee to invoke
47 See Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning:GATT Rules and Their Application
to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TuL. L.J. 299, 352 n.138 (1994) (citing International
Environmental Law Colloquium as source of term Trade-Related Environmental Measures); see also Robert Houseman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment and Sustainable
Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 535, 550-53 (1992) (explaining
TREMs). See generally Paul Demaret, EnvironmentalPolicy and Comm'l Policy: The Emergence of Trade-Related Environmental Measures (TREMs) in the External Relations of the
European Community, in THm EUROPEAN CoMi-uNrrVS COM'L POLICY AFrER 1992: THE
LEGAL DIMENSION 305, 345-61 (Marc Marescu ed., 1992).
48 See Agreement of Trade-Related Investment Measures, opened for signature Dec. 15,
1993, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS]; see also Catherine Curtiss &
Kathryn C. Atkinson, United States-Latin American Trade Laws, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 111, 127 (1995) (explaining TRIMs).
49 See Emilio J. Cardenas, The Regional Approach to Hemispheric Integration:A Modular Road Towards Free Trade, 1 Sw. J.L. & T.ADE Am. 49, 60 (1994) (stating that only
GATT can assure expansion of free trade because regional arrangements require policing);
see also Kevin A. Wechter, Note, NAFTA: A Compliment to GATT or a Setback to Global
Free Trade?, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2611, 2612 (1993) (suggesting that GATT is necessary to
maximize global wealth and welfare).
50 See Jayne E. Daly, Toward SustainableDevelopment: In Our Common Interest, 1995
PACE L. REV. 153, 158 n.24 (asserting that "sustainable development" is broad enough to
encompass its ideals); see also Joel B. Eisen, Towards a Sustainable Urbanism:Lessons
from FederalRegulation of Urban StormwaterRunoff, 48 WASH. U. J. Urn. & CONTEm.
L.
1, 3 (1995) (asserting that notion of "sustainability' is too ambiguous to function as universal standard for societal progress).
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the green, in order to "co-operate" in a world wide trend.5 In fact,
it must be recognized that the only international environmental
agreements to have been adopted thus far have been with respect
to global problems so serious that the consequences of not doing so
are immediate, awesome, and horrifying.
One theme of the trade writers who are seeking "compromise" is
that multilateral environmental agreements should lie at the
heart of the GATT/WTO's future environmental rules.52 Such
agreements, they say, could form the foundation for determining
whether a national measure was aimed legitimately at environmental, rather than trade protection. 53 It must be noted that such
agreements are notoriously difficult to reach, and even more difficult to enforce.
Another recurring motif is the apparent "concern" by trade writers for developing countries which might be unable to afford the
environmental standards set by industrialized nations. The often
repeated charge that environmentalists wish the Western world to
continue as it is, while the developing world picks up the tab for
conservation, is pure fiction designed to obscure the gravity of the
51 See James Cameron & Halina Ward, The Multinational Trade Organisation-A Revised Perspective, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRoNmENT: A SEARCH FOR BALANCE 96-115 (1994).
Writing before the final WTO agreement was passed, the authors discuss the need for the
WTO to be established within the guidelines suggested by "sustainable development." Id.
The authors point out that "whichever view one espouses, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the whole GATT system is endangered by the trade and environment debate."
Id.; see also GATT Secretariat, Trade and Environment Report, supra note 3. The 1992
GATT Report on Trade and the Environment is criticized for being "based on the entrenched views of the trade liberalization purist," which it most certainly is.
See Stanley M. Spracker & David C. Lungsfarrd, Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention
on the Futureof Free Trade and Protection of the Environment, 18 COLt-M. J. ENVTL. L. 385,
411, 415 n.118 (1993); cf Public Citizen v. United States Trade Rep., 5 F.3d 549, (D.C.Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994) (seeking environmental impact statement for
NAFTA). However, one is hard pressed to understand how "taking into account recent
thought on the relation between environment and development" on the part of the GATT"
will actually contribute to real change in the condition of the global environment.
52 See K. Gwen Beacham, InternationalTrade and the Environment: Implications of the
GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade for the Future ofEnvironmental ProtectionEfforts,
3 CoLO. L. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 655, 668-70 (1992) (discussing implications of environmental provisions); see also Shannon Hudnall, Towards a GreenerInt'l Trade System: MultilateralEnvironmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization,29 COLuM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 175, 175-81, 192 (1996) (analyzing effect of such agreements and exploring
environmental provisions); Jennifer Schultz, The GATTI WTO Committee on Trade and the
Environment-Toward Environmental Reform, 89 Am. J. INV'L L. 423, 423-25 (1995)
(claiming importance of global cooperation in environmental issues).
53 Real implementation and enforcement of any such agreements once finally reached
are even more elusive. One might recall the recent Bonn conference on global warming,
where, as was widely reported in the press, the oil producing states were incomprehensibly
allowed to play a significant role in setting the tone of the final resolution!
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objections being raised against the GATT/WTO's legal status and
54
authority.

B. A New Climate of Dissent Against the GATTI WTO Regime
For the first time in its fifty-year history, the GATT/WTO is exhibiting signs of intellectual vulnerability toward its critics in the
fields of economics, environmental studies, and law. From the
point of view of free trade forces, the one idea that must not be
allowed to gain ground is that the post-war globalized world no
longer benefits the majority of the world's citizens, and that
globalization as a project needs to be cut back. An equally threatening notion is that localities have lost control of their economies
and environments, while power and wealth becomes unnaturally
concentrated among multinational corporations. There is a growing awareness that by dismantling some of the frenetic passing
and re-passing of traded goods, there might in fact be profound
benefits both to the vast majority of ordinary people and to their
environments. It is simply not possible for the GATT/WTO system to "absorb" such far-reaching objections to the global free
55
trade system and still retain its trade ethos.
54 See, e.g., Skilton, supra note 4, at 455. The author suggests that various United States
legislative proposals which have sought to express environmental concerns with trade
measures have been flawed because of their "general insistence that the extraterritorial
application of national standards make these proposals unworkable." Id. The author says
that LDC's "will surely claim a financial inability to meet such high standards in rejecting
these proposals." Id. at 487.
Mr. Skilton proposes that a United States style international "pollution allowances trading system," would be "the most efficient way of promoting conservation without sacrificing
economic development. Working within the GATT structure, these countries should either
amend the General Agreement or negotiate a separate side agreement to set reduction
goals for environmentally-harmful activities and allocate transferable allowances." Id. at
491. Apart from what would certainly be a difficult concept given the vast inequalities in
wealth and power among the various global regions, Mr. Skilton's vision is of an adapted
system where the GATT remains firmly in control of "environmental" concerns.
55 The most impressive of these efforts to preserve the status of the GATT system by
making it "interface' with environmental concerns is that of Daniel Esty. See generally
Daniel Esty, Institute for InternationalEconomics, in GREENING THE GAT: TRADE, ENvWRONNENT AND THE FuTrunRE (1994). The author has devised a system, based on the existing
GATT principles, to take into account all environmental contingencies; he purports to show
how the GATT/WTO can in fact accommodate national environmental regulation, under
certain conditions. Id. at 283. The starting point for Mr. Esty's book is how to avoid the type
of high profile and highly divisive snarl that was the Tuna-Dolphin case. See id. at 27-32.
Five years after Tuna-Dolphin the idea of "greening the GATT"is already a tired concept, yet the symbolic appeal of this vision is milked with greater success by Mr. Esty than
any other commentator on the subject, although he actually presents little that is unique in
the book. Rather, the author has produced a masterful synthesis of the increasingly vast
commentary on GATT and the environment. Id. at 285-306. In "GATTing the Greens,"
chapter one of Mr. Esty's book, the author turns "Greening the GATIT" on its head to
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The fact is that the environmental movement's charges do
threaten the underlying logic of the GATT/WTO. It is for this reason that so much effort is being made to bring "redeemable" critics
on board in a cosmetic reform of the GATT/WTO with regard to
environmental issues, while firmly excluding those whose observations have led them beyond the GATT boundaries, and into the
unregenerate realm of the "eco-fanatic."5 6

demonstrate that there is nothing inherently contradictory about these two forces, the
GATr and the Green. Id. at 73-98. Mr. Esty sets out his aim clearly: "Ithe overarching goal
is to reconcile two important policy pursuits: the promotion of economic growth through
trade and protection of the environment." Id. at 2. Mr. Esty's deeper contention is that the
GATT cannot be content to merely accept or reject national measures aimed at protecting
the environment. Id.
Mr. Esty is brilliant at making it appear self-evident that the goals of free trade and the
environment are inseparable. The author writes that "[u]ltimately, the goal of this book is
to reconcile the various interests that must be brought together to achieve both continued
trade liberalization and effective environmental protection. The need to pursue these two
policy goals simultaneously is clear; both contribute in important ways to public and individual welfare." Id. at 6-7.
The author's credibility derives from the fact that he offers no resistance to the wrath
brought down on the GATT by the Tuna-Dolphin decision. Id. at 19-20. The author would
like "to ensure that environmental sensitivities are built into the international trade regime and to guarantee that free trade requirements are respected to the fullest extent possible in environmental policy making." Id. at 32.
56 See id. at 41. The author writes that:
much of the United States environmental community entered the trade and environment debate with a bias toward restructuring the rules and procedures of the GATT to
advance environmental priorities. Since environmentalists often bring to their work a
conviction that the environment represents a higher-order concern than trade, many
environmental groups believe the use of trade penalties to enforce environmental standards, whether embodied in multilateral agreements or unilaterally imposed, is justified without regard to the disruption to trade or any cost-benefit analysis.
Id. at 38. Mr. Esty tries to cast major critics of the current international trade regime (such
as Batra, Lang and Hines, and Daly and Cobb) into the outer darkness by misleadingly
linking their work to the Earth First type of deep ecology movement, about which their
work has remarkably little to say. They are serious critics of free trade whose work is
neither neo-Luddite nor utopian, yet Esty attempts to dismiss these along with what he
conceives of as disreputable, anti-growth environmentalists. Id. at 61. The author writes
that:
[t]he proposition that trade harms the environment and that more trade harms it more
has two separate environmental perspectives buried within it. First, some environmentalists adhere to a "limits to growth" philosophy and are opposed to economic development and thus to almost all trade. Adherents to this no-growth world view have
little interest in building environmental safeguards into the GATT. For them, no trade
is good trade. Other environmentalists accept "sustainable development" as a goal and
see economic growth as positive if it is achieved in ways that are sensitive to the environment. These "pragmatic" environmentalists seek to ensure that some of the gains
from trade are in fact devoted to environmental purposes and that environmental safeguards put the economic activities promoted by trade on a sustainable course.
Id. at 61-62.
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IV.

UNANSWERED CHALLENGES TO THE

GATT/WTO

It remains unsettled whether GATT/WTO is "law" as commonly
understood or whether it is a sub-species of public international
law, or a new category. Although the GATT/WTO is known as
part of "international economic law," based upon a broadly accepted treaty, few actually examine the GATT's contents, including those responsible for creating economic policies.5 7
Until 1995, the GATT gained influence through its very incrementalism. During the Tokyo Round of the 1970s, the GATT first
turned its attention to non-tariff issues, refined the law of antidumping and subsidies, and brought a measure of "GATT discipline" to such sensitive areas as government procurement.5 8 In
January 1995, however, the Uruguay Round represented a fairly
radical break with prior methodology by including a "coercive" dispute resolution component that would give the GATT a more recognizable "legal" framework.59 No longer would individual member states be able to block adverse panel decisions. The language
of diplomacy would yield to the language of procedures and penalties. In addition, entire new economic realms would be brought
within the GATT/WTO discipline-notably agriculture, intellectual property protection, and free trade in services and investments. These new areas represent a far deeper intrusion into the
economic life of individual nations than the traditional GATT focus on trade in manufactured goods could ever have. It remains to
be seen whether the GATT/WTO will actually work its will more
effectively through mandate than through the earlier quiet incrementalism. Presently, however, the GATT/WTO is self-appropriating wide areas of economic control.
All commentators will agree that the GATT has heightened the
level of international trade transactions by a huge margin over
the past forty five years. There is similarly no question about the
effectiveness of the GATT in virtually eliminating trade tariffs. It
has lowered them to the point where they are not considered significant obstacles to trade in most goods. For this reason and be57 See Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning:GATT Rules and their Application
to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299 n.8 (1994) (noting conflicting
interpretations of GAIT's impact).
58 See HUDEC, supranote 10, at 24; see also JOHN JACKSON, THm WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
LAw AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 56-57 (1989).

59 See Uruguay Round Agreement, supra note 2.
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cause the GATT/WTO proposes to extend further its influence
over national economies, it is a travesty that basic questions relative to its legal status and authority remain unresolved.6 0 This, in
turn, has everything to do with whether or not the GATT has been
responsible for environmental degradation, and whether it offers
advantages that make it worthy of deference by world governments into the future.
A.

Substantive Environmental Objections to GATT as "Law"
1. The environmental harm caused by the current free trade
system is part of a larger failure of the GATT/WTO to
deliver economic or social benefits to people
throughout the world.

A number of commentators are offering serious, well-reasoned
practical criticisms of the GATT system based on its projected effects. The most compelling arguments maintain that the GATT
system has pushed free trade beyond its optimal upper boundaries, causing widespread human dislocation and a decline in general standards of living.6 1
6o See Susana H. Puente, Section 301 and the New WTO DisputeSettlement Understanding, 2 ILSA J. INr'L & ComP. L. 213, 231 (1995) (discussing effect of varying jurisdictional
interpretations); see also GATT: Considerationof World Trade OrganizationTied to Uruguay Round Success, Crosbie Says, Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 588 (Apr. 25, 1990)
(quoting Canadian Trade Minister as stating that GATT is not organization but an unknown animal).

61 See generally RAvi BATRA, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE (1993). Mr. Batra makes the

general intellectual and economic case against free trade in the most straightforward fashion, using government statistics to show a strong link between a rising level of dependence
on international trade in the United States and declining wages. But see Esty, supra note
55, at 56. Mr. Esty, unaccountably, places Batra in the camp of what he terms:
purists [who] argue that trade should be made subordinate to environmental ends....
In its extreme form, this viewpoint might be used to argue for broad limitations on
trade. Even a more temperate version would require a thorough overhaul of the GATT
to ensure that the advancement of environmental values becomes a priority of the
trade regime.
Id. However, this seems to be a plain mischaracterisation of Mr. Batra's views. Mr. Batra
would by no means agree with Mr. Esty's starting point that free trade, to the degree currently practiced, is conducive to human wealth and happiness. Of course, one is free to
challenge an author's reasoning or the conclusions he draws from the evidence. Mr Esty is
simply wrong, however, in stating that Mr. Batra would subordinate the supposed "gains"
of free trade to environmental considerations. Id. at 56.
Criticizing authors Lang & Hines, as well as Batra, Mr. Esty writes that:
[tihis environmental critique of trade proffers insights into the reform that is required
of the GATT but, in its strict form, cannot provide a foundation for both trade liberalization and environmental protection. Redesigning the trade regime to serve environmental ends alone risks sacrificing the contribution to well-being in general and to
environmental protection in particular that sustainable, trade-generated growth
promises.
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Few serious writers on trade and the environment from the environmentalist point of view are against all forms of international
trade. As we enter a phase of increased legalism and coercive
powers in the GATT, the question is whether an agreement that
calls for such extreme inter-penetration of economies can be truly
beneficial, either economically or environmentally. The parallel
question is, of course, whether the environmental damage caused
by the production and transport of exports should be permitted to
continue at its present rate. 2
Id. Again, Mr. Batra's main thesis is precisely that trade-generated growth at the level
pursued since the 1970s is not contributing to well-being, even or especially in the purely
economic sense.
62 See generally BATBA, supra note 61. The author makes a clear-cut case for the interrelatedness of economic and environmental harms. Id. at 215-230. Ironically, Batra reads
like a fairly conservative economist, hardly a "deep ecology" advocate. His thesis is that
domestic competition is useful for product innovation and benefits to consumers, while unlimited internationalcompetition (accompanied by domestic mergers and a shrinking of the
number of domestic companies) leaves behind large numbers of economic losers within a
given country-in the case of Batra's study, the United States. Id. at 164-183. Batra reviews American trade history to show how the ratio of import-export trade to GNP had
remained at a constant and relatively low rate until 1973, after which the dependence of
the U.S. economy on international trade grew dramatically. Id. at 128-163. It is also from
that point in time that Batra sees the decline in wages and deindustrialisation characteristic of recent developments in the American economy. The author writes that:
When trade hurts a country, protectionism alone cannot help. It has to be accompanied
by increased domestic competition among firms and industries. Otherwise, local companies will simply raise prices, produce shoddy products, and pay their executives
enormous bonuses. This is exactly what monopolistic protectionism does. However,
this book calls for competitive protectionism, which means breaking up import-competing monopolies into smaller firms while at the same time vigorously protecting them
from predatory foreign competition.
The benefits of protectionism today are not limited to the living standard. Few people realize that international trade is the worst polluter among all economic activities;
in fact, trade uses more than twice the amount of energy utilised by equivalent local
production.
Id. at 5.
Mr. Batra is convinced that the facts about free trade as currently practiced are being
ignored because policy makers have not yet created a new theory of international economic
relations, and are blindly following the dogma of free trade. The author calls for "average
weekly earnings" as a far better and more accurate measure of living standards than GDP
or GNP, which merely measures in the aggregate and fails to show an overall decline in
wages. Id. at 20. Mr. Batra cogently argues that an artificial separation of "consumers'"
interests from "workers' interests cannot hold up under scrutiny. Id. He writes that the
assumptions in the 1988 President's Economic Report were that "consumers are different
from workers, so that while workers suffer, at least consumers benefit. Real earnings actually dropped for 80% of workers and their families, all of whom are also consumers. Hence
the living standard declined for four fifths of the consumers and population because of intense foreign competition." Id. at 70.
Mr. Batra's ideas are well-founded enough to at least deserve a coherent response by
those who are assuming that wealth and welfare are generated by international trade. Mr.
Batra's belief in the free market and in competition is very explicit; he is also not against a
certain level of free trade. Id. The author is singularly clear, though, in demonstrating
exactly why the reality of free international trade is not quite what its promoters claim.
The author writes that:
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2. Even though the earth can absorb a certain level of
international trade, there is currently a degree of
global activity that involves so much unnecessary
transport of goods, as well as such
preoccupation with producing goods and services for
export that the GATT/WTO is leading us rapidly down an
environmentally unsustainable path.
Mainstream commentators rarely mention this rather obvious
and basic issue regarding the environmental unsustainability of
the enormous energy consumption required by unfettered free
trade. It appears that most of these commentators feel this to be
of negligible significance to the global environment. 63 In the current trade-environment debate, there is a great deal of discussion
concerning how to get the Third World to adopt the "high" environmental standards enjoyed by the Western industrialized countries. In fact, the developed world is the greatest source of pollu[tihe government neglect of merger mania reveals the total bankruptcy of official economic policy. Trade liberalization is supposed to generate competition between home
and foreign producers; but mergers restrict domestic competition as one giant firm gobbles up others. In its wisdom, the government in the 1980s decided that foreign competition was preferable to domestic competition, that foreign predators were more trustworthy than local rivals.
Id. What a bizarre idea! It should be the other way around. Competition is vital for efficiency. It is the cradle of giant productivity gains-but not when it comes from abroad.
Given the choice, domestic competition is far better than foreign competition. Government
policy was thus, at best, contradictory; at worst, self-destructive." Id. at 78.
63 See LANG & HINEs, supra note 39, at 61-62. The authors write that:
[mIore global trade creates waste and pollution by the very act of transporting goods
over great distances ....
[I]f it is cost effective to keep bringing citrus fruits 10,000
miles from Latin America to Europe while Mediterranean countries dump fruit, there
is something wrong with the costings system. The same problem arises within the European single market. Take croissants, for example.
Transport fuelled by oil contributes to a wide range of environmental hazards-local
air pollution, international acid deposition and global warming, as well as depleting a
non-renewable resource. So does it really make sense to transport identical goods
around the world in the name of free trade? The European Commission's Task Force on
the Environment has calculated that there will be a 30-50 per cent increase in through
traffic from 1993 with the trade liberalization following the opening of EC borders in
the single market. In the middle European countries, public opposition to traffic has
risen. Austria reported an increase in through traffic between 1975 and 1990 of
1,000,000 tonnes a year. One narrow Alpine Valley, the Inn Valley/Brenner pass, takes
75 per cent of the total. Roads now carry the majority of transport, compared to 15
years ago when less polluting rail took 70 per cent.
Consumers are paying for this. One Danish study of the price per kilo paid by consumers for flour found that the farmer got 21 per cent, the flour mill 11 per cent and 46
per cent was spent on packaging, transport and retailing. Of the money the consumer
pays for bottled water: the water is only 8 per cent, the bottle 24 per cent, advertising,
shipping and retailing 50 per cent, tax 13 per cent, and manufacturer's profit only 5
per cent.
Id.
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tion, and what environmentalists fear is that unbridled
international competition will cause a shifting of the export wars
to the developing world. This shift would effectively curtail the
modest gains in regulation made over the past twenty-five years
in industrialized countries, as well as cause a truly intolerable
level of world economic activity. 6 Wide scale intra-industry trade
between nations is relatively new and extremely difficult to justify
in economic or welfare terms. Inter-commodity trade, involving
the exchange of distinct goods, has at least the virtue of meeting
real needs by potentially filling a gap in a particular economy.65
3.

The doctrine of Comparative Advantage is a simplistic and
outdated concept. It does not provide sufficient
reason to pursue unlimited liberalization of
trade, and as a mere theory does not
guarantee mutual benefit to trading nations.

Most standard works on the GATT or on trade history cite the
doctrine of comparative advantage as the basis upon which free
trade is believed to create more wealth than would otherwise exSee BATRA, supra note 61, at 220. The author writes that:
Since 1950, the world's population has more than doubled, while global economic activity has quadrupled. But world trade has grown faster than even GDP, especially in the
1960s, when trade growth was nearly twice GDP growth. Overall, between 1950 and
1990, trade grew at 1.5 times the pace of increase in economic activity.
More than 60 percent of global GDP is generated by the G-7 nations: United States,
Japan, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, and Britain. Their exports constitute nearly
65 percent of the world's total. They are also the biggest polluters. According to the
1991 World Development Report, per capita energy consumption in the G-7 nations (or
OECD countries, in which the G-7 are included) is at least four times that of the rest of
the world.
Id.
Mr. Batra further writes that:
[a]ccording to Global Outlook 2000, the share of transportation in energy consumption
64

rose steadily from 24 percent in 1970 to 31 percent in 1989 ....

[Alir freight fuel

consumption almost tripled in just two decades. In addition, airborne trade emitted 2.1
million tons of nitrogen oxides in 1990; nearly 40 percent of it dispersed into U.S. skies.
Id. at 222.
Furthermore, the author writes that:
[b]oth transportation and freight are energy inefficient relative to production. Not only
has trade consumed more energy since 1960, it is incredibly wasteful relative to overall
economic activity. The energy intensity of domestic trade in 1989 was 51,000 BTUs,
more than twice the level of 20,000 BTUs for GNP .... What is more alarming is that
the gap [between trade's energy intensity and GNP] has increased over time, indicating how wasteful trade today is of environmental resources.
Id. at 225.
6 See id. at 226-227.
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ist; that is in the absence of trade.66 However, there is good reason
to believe that the original theory of comparative advantage was
premised upon a very different economy with respect to the role of
capital. International lawyers should consider whether to attribute to the GATT/WTO system so much power and influence,
based as it is on so questionable a theoretical framework. Thus, it
is unconscionable not to exercise far more rigorous empirical analysis of the effects of "ever-freer trade" on the world's working
people.
A primary objection to the doctrine of comparative advantage is
that Ricardo 67 certainly would have had in mind a world in which
capital remained within national boundaries, rather than the current transglobal free flow of capital, guided only by considerations
of greatest short-term profit.68 If serious flaws are established con6 See Jackson, supra note 30, at 13-14. After explaining the workings of the theory of
comparative advantage, the author writes that:
[ellaborations of the simple model [of comparative advantage], however, all seem to
point in the same direction. A large number of studies exist, based on various plausible
theories or analyses of the effects of restraints on trade, which show a loss in welfare
for the world as a whole and often also for the countries imposing the restrictions.
These restraints cause costs to be borne by the economies, usually costs which are
imposed on the consumers of the imported product.
Id. Mr. Jackson continues that "[tihe theory does have strong intuitive appeal. As consumers, individual citizens can easily see the advantage of international trade: it gives them
greater choice of products at better prices ....
Of course, the question remains whether
Adam Smith was right when he claimed that what is good for families is also good for
nations ....
The advantages that buyers discover in individual cases may result in an
overall disadvantage for a nation as a whole.
One thing does seem clear, however. Import trade provides an additional source of competition to domestic producers. Considered intuitively, and on the basis of a large number
of studies, competition is almost always deemed beneficial to world or national-aggregate
economic welfare. Id. at 13. Furthermore, the author writes that "[ylet there are groups in
a national economy which experience loss from shifts to freer trade, such as the employees
who lose their jobs in a domestic industry because of competition from imports ....
The
question is, Why should influences from beyond a nation's borders, ones requiring 'structural adjustment changes,' be treated differently than such influences from within a nation's borders?" Id. at 13-14.
67 David Ricardo was a nineteenth century economist who developed the doctrine of comparative advantage. See Jackson, supra note 74, at 10-11 (crediting Ricardo with introduction of comparative advantage theory); see also Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90
Nw. U. L. Rav. 658, 661 n.20 (1996) (citing Ricardo's comparative advantage theory as
foundation for GATT); Susan L. Smith, Ecologically Sustainable Development: Integrating
Economies, Ecology, and Law, 31 W.smmETrE L. REv. 261, 305 n.23 (1995) (describing
David Ricardo as pessimistic about prospects for long-term growth).
68 See LANG & HnNEs, supra note 39, at 20-22. The authors write that:
[tloday Ricardo's example would be upset by the capacity of capital to move, since
many economies have deregulated controls on capital, especially internationally. Now
Portuguese capital would at first flow to wine, increasing its productivity and output
and the price would drop. Capital would therefore flow to cloth where Portugal also has
a comparative advantage. The result would probably be such a drop in the price of
Portuguese cloth that the English cloth producers would eventually be forced out of the
market, due to cheaper Portuguese imports. English capital would also flow to Portu-
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cerning the old doctrine of comparative advantage, at least policy
makers, international lawyers and multinational corporations
would be obliged to develop a more cogent explanation for pursuing an ever-increasing level of international trade.
4. Environmentalists are concerned both that GATT/WTO
panels can invalidate national environmental protection
measures, and that international trade is an
environmentally destructive way of getting goods to
people. The GATT bias in favor of avoiding
"protectionism," even at the cost of environmental and
labor standards, is unacceptable.
Although the Tuna-Dolphin controversy represents only one aspect of the free trade problem as a whole, it awakened environmentalists with regard to the power held by GATT panels to invalidate national environmental measures having "protectionist"
implications from a GATT point of view. This rather shocking degal to supplement Portuguese capital, making even more inevitable the situation
where both wine and cloth are produced in Portugal. Under the European Community,
English labour might also move to Portugal, thus reducing labor costs even more because of the competition for jobs involved ....The free flow of capital and goods, and
not just of goods as was basically the case in Smith's and Ricardo's time, means that
investment is now governed by absolute profitability and not by comparative advantage between countries. Neither Ricardo nor Smith thought that capital would be so
mobile.
Id. at 20-22; see also HERMAN DALY AND JOHN COBB, FOR THE COMMON GOOD 212-16 (1990).
The authors are clearest on the issue of comparative advantage doctrine, and sum up the
significance of the doctrine by stating that "[wihat economists want to show is that even
when both nations can produce all the goods under consideration, it is nevertheless to their
advantage to specialize and exchange." Id. However, the authors continue that "Ricardo
himself knew that for the theory to work, capital would have to be assumed not to be internationally mobile." Id. at 213-214. Most telling, the authors further state that:
[iut
is clear that Smith and Ricardo were considering a world in which capitalists were
fundamentally good Englishmen, Frenchmen, and so on-not a world of cosmopolitan
money managers and transnational corporations which, in addition to having limited
liability and immortality conferred on them by national governments, have now transcended those very governments and no longer see the national community as their
context... If Smith or Ricardo were alive today we suspect they would not be preaching free trade. The whole basis for their case, factor immobility, has been eroded by
time and change. They were above all realists who paid close attention to actual conditions. Their intellectual progeny, however, are idealists, ideologues, and logicians. Academic economists have become so enamoured of the logical argument for comparative
advantage and find it so ideologically in tune with their unrelenting celebration of the
free market, that they are loath to re-examine it. They have suppressed recognition of
the fact that the empirical cornerstone of the whole classical free trade argument, capital immobility, has crumbled into loose gravel.
Id. at 215-16; Robert E. Hudec, Differences in National Environmental Standards: The
Level-Playing-FieldDimension, 5 MiNN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 22 (1996) (discussing comparative advantage theory and role of David Ricardo); Nichols, supra note 67, at 679 (discussing
role of labor in Ricardo's theory).
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cision brought the trade-environment split out into the open, and
caused environmental groups to begin questioning many of the
underlying premises upon which the GATT/WTO edifice has been
built. As has been shown, the academic establishment reacted
with a barrage of commentaries designed to convince environmental critics that the GATT could be made responsive to environmental sensitivities, and that it could, as a system, be reformed to ac69
commodate those sensitivities.
What mainstream scholars and the GATT establishment may
not have counted on was the fact that once the question began to
be asked, 'Why should a GATT panel be able to invalidate a national law to protect dolphins?' this would generate a serious examination of the more general effects of the GATT on human life
around the globe, resulting in broad-ranging environmental, social, and economic critiques. The mandate of a GATT panel lacks
the complexity of analysis typically required of a court of law. The
panel's job is simply to determine whether or not a particular action by a member state is GATT-illegal or contrary to GATT principles. National measures are examined against the handful of
basic GATT ideas to see whether or not they are guilty of fostering
"protectionism." Even if the GATT/WTO is reformed in order to
take environmental concerns into account, the main thrust of
GATT thinking can never be other than in favor of ever-increasing
free trade.7 °

69 See generally Esty, supra note 55, at 205-231.
70 See LANG & HiNEs, supra note 39, at 66. The authors write:
The implications of [the Tuna-Dolphin decision] for international environmental treaties or conventions are disastrous. It 'unequivocally' rendered illegal trade measures
applied by individual nations to conserve wildlife and ecosystems beyond their national boundaries, including the high seas and all other global commons. The judgment
removed the only compliance mechanism--economic sanctions-available to protect
these habitats and natural resources and could therefore threaten the Convention on
the International Trade in Endangered Species and any climate convention.
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While international trade will never be abolished, the
proportion of most economies devoted to it should be
decreased both in the developed and developing worlds. A
return to a more localized production would stem the
acute social breakdown, loss of community, soaring
unemployment, and environmental degradation currently
occurring.

A natural concomitant of specialization on the international
scale is that the diversity of particular economies is hollowed out,
with a result that local production for local consumption loses out
almost entirely as nations strive to satisfy the needs of their export markets. Following in the wake of the economist, the international lawyer is equally willing to "specialize" in GATT/WTO
principles, after accepting the correctness of the underlying GATT
doctrine.
It would seem that the negative effects of excessive free trade,
causing an unduly high proportion of one's economy to be tied up
in import-export trade, are substantially different depending on
which region of the world one inhabits. However, the widening
gap between rich and poor, with ever-larger tracts of land being
lost to industrial or commodity production or retail outlets, seem
to be worldwide norms. Before advocating legal doctrine that fosters ever-deepening globalization, surely there must be some exploration of the cultural and social aspects of giving over regional
and national control of one's economy to global forces. After all,
except for the fact that one's elected representatives vote to allow
for the continuation of GATT-based policies, it is fair to say that
there are no democratic controls on the international banks and
multinational corporations that, because of ever-expanding liberalization of trade, have such an enormous effect on life in all parts
of the globe. To merely explicate the GATT, without first attempting to understand and independently evaluate its real effects,
strikes one as an abdication of the responsibility of an international legal scholar. 7 '
71 Cf DALY & COBB, supra note 68, at 121-37. The authors criticize the disciplinary organization of knowledge in the field of economics as working against our need for understanding. Id. The authors complain of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" among economists, which occurs partly as a result of the fact that academic knowledge is now so
departmentalized that it is easier than it would otherwise be to ignore reality in favor of a
convenient theory. Id. at 127. What is left out of the economists' equation are the vital
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International lawyers must take a position on more than
whether Article XX of the GATT, for instance, can be adjusted so
as to allow for certain TREMs to be put in place by national governments. 72 It is the GATT/WTO system that is continuing to dismantle all traces of local economic decision-making,73 long after
the system's initial positive benefits have been left behind. If one
wishes to celebrate free trade and write positively about changes
brought about by the Uruguay Round talks, one must also be prepared to celebrate results which include the breakdown of many
aspects of local cultural particularity. The international trade
lawyer must do more than merely interpret and explain the intricacies of the GATT. 7 4
V.

How TO RESPOND TO CALLS FOR A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ORGANIZATION TO "PARALLEL" THE

GATT

A central thesis of this paper has been that the free trade establishment is employing enormous amounts of intellectual energy to
create arguments for the "coming together" of the ostensibly complementary and mutually worthy goals of "ever-freer trade" and
the environment.15 The degree of frustration voiced over the
power of the GATT to subvert national environmental goals first
heard after the Tuna-Dolphin decision, and then during the debate over the Uruguay Round agreements, has made it plain to
even the most ardent free traders that some damage control is urhuman realities of social community and biophysical interdependence. Id. at 137. Instead,
in economics, which forms the basis for international legal study of the GATT and other
free trade systems, "[w]hat is emphasised is the optimal allocation of resources that can be
shown to result from the mechanical interplay of individual self-interests." Id. The authors
caution against excessive academic specialization, of which international lawyers studying
the GATT are certainly guilty. Id. at 131-32. The authors admonish free trade advocates
with the warning that "[c]ontinuous growth in the scale of the aggregate economy could
only make sense in the context of an unlimited environment." Id. at 145.
72 See GATr, supra note 1, art. XX.
73 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HowSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 14 (1995) (noting increased economic interdependence constrains political
sovereignty).
74 See LANG & HInEs, supra note 39, at 107-09. The authors state that:
[firee trade, promoting competition and claiming comparative advantage, cuts down
the number of workers and the number of places where work occurs. As a result, local
economies are sacrificed and soon suffer from a downward spiral of declining infrastructure, low morale and the blight of unemployment. Governments (both local and
national) are relatively powerless against this widely accepted economic logic.
Id.
75 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The Case for Free Trade, ScI. AM., Nov. 1993, at 42 (arguing that 'conflict' between free-traders and environmentalists is largely illusory).
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gently required. Thus, one can expect to see a number of proposals offered that will attempt to "integrate" environmental aspirations and the free trade agenda. No longer expecting to ignore
successfully environmental objections, mainstream GATT lawyers
and other trade commentators can be expected to push for a sensible compromise-sensible according to the terms laid down by the
GATT as it has functioned since 1947, as the undisputed and idiosyncratically "legal" source for international trade policy.76
An enormous danger for environmentalists in assenting to such
"reforms" of the GATT/WTO through the creation of a parallel organization, or through the inclusion in the GATT of an environmental code, is that acceptable environmental concerns will then
be only those which do not insist that nations are engaging in too
much global trade, or that the existing levels of trade are causing
harm economically, culturally, socially, and environmentally. In
other words, any attempt to "remake" the GATT such that it
would cease to attract the wrath of environmentalists would, by
definition, create a climate in which "allowable" environmental
concerns were those which simultaneously posed no serious objec76 See, e.g., Esty, supra note 55, at 205-24. Mr. Esty recommends specific changes to
GATT in light of environmental considerations, although he recognizes that a Global Environmental Organization may prove extremely difficult to create in the near term. Id. at 98.
He sees it as an entity which could act in co-operation with the GATT/WTO, in such a way
as to prevent environmental criticisms from overturning the familiar goals of the GATT. Id.
at 78-83. For this to happen, as we have seen, would require that other criticisms, by those
who see ever-freer trade per se as an environmental culprit, would have to be ignored. Id.
Undaunted, the author writes:
Trade liberalization and environmental protection share a common aim: enhancing social welfare by improving the quality of life. In striving for the common goal, considerable conflict inevitably arises over differences in approaches and emphases. Nevertheless, as this study has stressed, the scope for reducing the tension between trade and
environmental policy is also considerable.
Id. at 225. This is a purely rhetorical construct, which can only purport to express something meaningful about the natural relation between free trade and the goals of the environmental movement if in fact ever-freer trade can be shown to be improving the general
quality of life. Mr. Esty is able to express this view only if he accepts as given the fact that
ever-freer trade leads to such economic and social benefits for most people.
This is a point that the author makes no attempt to prove or justify, instead choosing to
leave this essential element up to the general theoretical predisposition in academic circles
to accept free trade as a self-evident economic good. The author further attributes certain
"intentions" to the environmental movement which are far more the products of Esty's own
academic scheme than of the pronouncements of environmentalists. "But the battle lines
need not become entrenched. Both sides of the trade and environment debate seek to improve the efficiency of resource use and to add to worldwide social welfare." Id. at 226.
Although Mr. Esty is certainly not the first to speak of"efficiency" with regard to the goals
of the international environmental movement's aspirations, he must know that the term
"efficiency" as used by free traders and by environmentalists is likely to refer to very different things.
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tion to the world trading order itself. For environmental analysis
to lose its independence from GATT doctrine would be an intellectual tragedy.
It might well be asked what would happen if, under a new
global organization, environmental concerns were treated comprehensively, in a manner analogous to the GATT system. v One
would have little complaint about the creation of a global organization that sought to prevent individual nations from casting their
"externalities" onto the rest of the world, and it is quite true that
cost internalization can only really be achieved at the global level.
However, this problem cannot be solved at the expense of the autonomy of the environmental movement. One readily concedes
that it is nearly impossible to enforce effectively international
agreements when the treaty goals involve the seeking of goodness
rather than profit. On the other hand, this dilemma can hardly be
overcome by altering our manner of conceptualizing environmental problems. In this case, of course, in order to make the existing
global GATT/WTO work in tandem with some notional Global Environmental Organizations ("GEOs"), one would be forced to state
falsely that "ever-freer trade" makes no negative "contribution" to
such basic problems as over-consumption of resources, over-development of nature, loss of habitats, and destruction of distinct
cultures. 7
77 Id. at 77-78. Esty even suggests that environmentalists are envious of the GATT's
ability to defend itself against special interests. Id. The author states that "[the lack of an

institutional structure to protect the environment the way the GATI guards free trade lies
at the heart of the antagonism between trade and environmental interests." Id. at 77.
Again, the author's choice on this issue as the "heart" of the antagonism is his own personal
act; environmental criticism of the GAT system has more to do with concrete degradation
and depletion caused by over-use of various resources, including energy, as well as over-

consumption, all of which are encouraged and fostered by the "ever-freer trade" system.
This is a peculiar and actually distracting argument, far removed from the vital issues at
hand.
78 See id. at 78-83. Exploring possibilities of a hypothetical Global Environmental Organization, the author writes that "[i]f the environment had its own effective international

body, the narrow focus of the GATT on trade principles would not seem so oppressive to
environmentalists." Id. at 83. Mr. Esty even says that there could be "a functional division
of responsibilities where trade and environmental responsibilities intersect." Id. Oddly, the
GEO would "adjudicate the validity of environmental claims that result in trade-restrictive
policies and this would be of great benefit to the GATT." Id. While the author at least
recognizes the logical difficulties in getting such an organization to work in the face of the

powerful interests which could oppose it, he, nonetheless, wants to do away with the traditional "issue by issue" approach taken by environmentalists. Id. at 91. While no one could

deny that this approach has indeed been quite ineffective, it is also necessary to acknowledge that this ineffectuality is not due to some faulty method "preferred" by environmental-

ists, but rather to the very resistance of powerful interests referred to by Esty himself.
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For an environmental organization to accept all the underlying
principles of free trade would nearly guarantee its incompetence
for purposes of reversing environmental degradation. If the goal
were merely to improve the existing situation slightly, then perhaps such a compromise would be proper. But such a modest goal
is hardly representative of the intentions of the "international environmental movement," as broad, diverse, and diffuse as that
grouping may admittedly be. There is a further danger that a
great deal of environmentalist energy could be diverted toward a
structure designed primarily to bolster the image and concept of
"ever-freer trade."7 9

VI. THE GATT/WTO As ENViRONm:ENTAL ARBITER
There are obviously inherent difficulties in making the GATT/
WTO and a new GEO run in parallel relation to each other. In
reality, it is highly unlikely that any such GEO will be created to
carry out such a function. 0 In positing its creation, the GATT/
WTO may simply be encouraging those interested in the subject to
begin to imagine that the GATT/WTO can somehow be effectively
reformed so as to include environmental concerns within its ambit, even in the absence of a GEO. 8 '
79 See id. at 77-83. The author's description makes clear that the GEO would be a consensus entity, taking action on behalf of environmental issues the "credentials" of which
were well established. Id. Mr. Esty writes that "[a] GEO need not begin life all-powerful. It
would be appropriate for the new organization to have a sliding scale of authority depending on the global reach, severity, scientific certainty, and time urgency of the various environmental problems it took up." Id. at 81. Such a "narrowly tailored" GEO would nevertheless, in Mr. Esty's scheme, be "a single, recognised forum for settling environmental
disputes with established technical competence and neutrality." Id. at 82.
80 See id. at 98 (noting that prospects for creation of new international environmental
entity with "comprehensive and coherent mandate in near future are dim").
81 See Esty, supra note 54, at 99 (listing proposed GATT reforms). The author writes
that:
In an ideal world, environmental authorities would make environmental judgments,
and trade authorities would render trade decisions. But in the absence of a recognized
environmental dispute settlement body, or a Global Environmental Organization,
available for this purpose, the GATT is the sole candidate for applying the proposed
test. However, to do so effectively it must much more aggressively recruit environmental experts for its dispute panels. Indeed, these new trade and environmental rules
should be implemented along with reform of the GATT dispute resolution process.
Id. at 115-16. The "test"to which Mr. Esty refers is of course a test for whether a particular
trade measure is legal in terms of trade rules, in light of the incorporation of some environmental considerations into standard trade doctrine. Id. at 114-15. While the author admits
that he would himself like to see such environmentally-related decision-making "shifted"
out of the GATT, he appears to think, no doubt correctly, that there is little genuine likelihood that this will happen. Id. at 115-16.
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It is quite possible that in the future the GATTIWTO legal experts will devise an elaborate legal test for evaluating the legal
legitimacy or "GATT-legality" of a given TREM.8 2 Those free trade
forces clever enough to see that the GATT cannot continue to ignore environmental concerns know that Article XX of the GATT is
83
simply not "substantive" enough to make the critics go away.
There is likely to be an "environmental round" of negotiations at
the GATT/WTO in the not distant future. It is to be hoped that
most environmentalists will not be persuaded to accept the idea
that the GATT is "improving" itself by in effect appropriating to
8 4
itself the role of international environmental referee.
Not surprisingly, free trade advocates, including many GATT/
WTO legal scholars, would like to see a heavy reliance on "multilateral standards" as the yardstick for evaluating the trade-legiti82 See id. at 114-30 (detailing proposed test for legitimacy of environmental trade
measures).
83 See id. at 221-22 (describing proposed changes to Article XX of GATT); see also GATT,
supra note 1, art. XX. Article XX is the "General Exceptions" article of the GATT. Id. Article XX reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures... (b) necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health;.., and (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
Id. The United States failed to convince the GATT panel in the Tuna-Dolphin case that its
Marine Mammal Legislation should fall within an Article XX exception. This decision, however, settled nothing. In fact, it was the spark that ignited the full debate over trade and
the environment. Obviously, the diction of Article XX is too heavily weighted in favour of
free trade doctrine to provide a convincing counter balance from an environmental point of
view.
84 See Esty, supra note 55, at 115-16 (discussing GATTs role in settling trade and environment disputes). Predictably, the author is the best at synthesising an academic trend
towards regularizing the standard by which this environmentally enhanced GATT/WTO
would make decisions. Id. Mr. Esty suggests a three-pronged test according to which the
GATT would size up a nation's TREM. Id. at 114. First, the "intent and effect" of the measure would be scrutinised for any improper desire to restrict trade; second, the "environmental legitimacy" of the measure's subject would be examined. Id. at 116-17. Mr. Esty
would give a presumption of legitimacy to any measure that was part of the implementation of an international environmental treaty. Id. at 117. Lastly, the measure (TREM)
would be looked at to see if it causes any "unjustified trade distortion" as far as its means
are concerned. Id. at 127-30.
The author would take this sort of test and substitute its supposed rigors for the vagueness of Article XX, id. at 115, although how far his test actually takes us from Article XX is
not entirely clear. As indicated previously, Mr. Esty's scheme would have the ultimate effect of bestowing on the GATT substantive evaluative abilities in the environmental area.
Mr. Esty manages to construct this logical edifice only by glossing over some extremely
fundamental conflicts between even quite moderate environmentalists and free trade
advocates.
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macy of a given nation's TREM. 5 It must be pointed out, however,
that this would both distance us from any possibility of genuine
change in the world trading order, because of the extreme difficulty of arriving at such an agreement, while also begging the
question of how much sovereignty an individual country has to set
a higher standard in environmental policy, including whatever
trade measures might be available to it. To say that a nation may
act unilaterally only to the limits of multilateral agreements
sheds little light on the questions left unanswered in the wake of
the Tuna-Dolphin controversy.
To bear hostility toward "unilateral" national measures taken in
defense of the environment is a notion derived entirely from the
world of liberal trade; it is not in any sense an environmentally
based idea. Whether or not a trade measure is some sort of "green
protectionism" is likewise the worry of those who are supporters of
evermore liberal trade. The mere fact that free trade advocates
are unhappy about such measures hardly bestows upon them an
obvious right to invalidate the environmentally motivated statutes of any particular nation, unless one assumes general preemptive powers for free trade principles. Some commentators argue that the "two sides," as they are called, can agree about what
constitutes the proper level of national environmental protection.
But such a configuration leaves no place whatsoever for the sizeable part of the environmental movement which believes that constantly liberalizing "free trade" is inherently destructive to the
goals of the global environmental movement. Labeling such a
range of critics "neo-Luddites" is merely a poor excuse for
86

argument.

85 See generally id. at 145-58 (examining ideal of multilateral standards).
8 See, e.g., id. at 219-220 (advocating GATT participation in environmental treaty negotiations). The author's belief that there ought to be an "environmental face lift" for the
GATT to improve its "credibility" is rather chilling. Id. at 220, 224. As far as this crossconflict co-operation is concerned, the author writes:
It would also be useful to have GATT officials participate in environmental treaty negotiations so that trade interests could be woven into the agreements from the start.
Co-ordinated trade and environmental policy making-including the specification of
not only standards but appropriate trade remedies for non-compliance and perhaps
even compliance evaluation mechanisms within the environmental agreementminimises the chances of a later GATT conflict over enforcement. The parallel policyhaving environmental officials participate in trade negotiations-should also become
standard practice.
Id. at 219-20. It is highly questionable whether "environmental officials" can be considered
the same as the environmental movement, and the author clearly is continuing his quest to
diminish the chances that current trade policies and practices will ever be forced to alter in
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CONCLUSION

In the case of national laws, where reasonably democratic political structures are in place, one generally makes assumptions concerning the source of authority for any positive law being examined. However, supranational or multilateral trade law is
rather distinctive in this regard. It may even be distinguished
from most public international law, if only because it does not codify the traditional behavior of nations, and because it has a far
greater power than is normal with treaties to coerce nations in
their every day economic choices. Thus, trade law wields enormous influence over the lives of citizens who may not even be
aware of the existence of such law. Given its power to alter the
very fabric of people's lives, it would seem illogical that the legal
processes of international economic law should remain so invisible, and thus impervious to being altered by ordinary processes of
political input.
Thus far, scholars and international lawyers have dealt with
this conceptual problem by repeating that since the GATT/WTO
system is producing wealth and social benefits for people, it is
therefore a self-evident good. Lately, several very strong argu87
ments have been put forward to challenge this point of view.

It

must be asked, therefore, whether it is possible for the international legal scholar to content himself or herself with merely recounting the history of the GATT/WTO, or explicating the provisions of the GATT and later codes and agreements, without
examining the actuality of life on the ground, in both developing
and developed worlds, for those affected by our system of "everfreer trade."8 8 Trade law scholars must begin the indispensable
response to very fundamental, complex objections which hold that free trade as currently
configured is not capable of delivering economic or environmental benefits to most people.

Id.
87 See, e.g., Herman E. Daly, The Perils of Free Trade, Sc. AM., Nov. 1993, at 50 (challenging presumed benefits of free trade).

88 See DALY & COBB, supra note 68, at 127. The authors write:

What is the set of abstractions that political economy has riveted on economic thought
and at which it has come to a self-satisfied halt? One of the most important is the
abstraction of a circular flow of national product and income regulated by a perfectly
competitive market. This is conceived as a mechanical analog, with motive force provided by individualistic maximization of utility and profit, in abstraction from social
community and biophysical interdependence. What is emphasized is the optimal allocation of resources that can be shown to result from the mechanical interplay of individual self-interests. What is neglected is the effect of one person's welfare on that of
others through bonds of sympathy and human community, and the physical effects of
one person's production and consumption activities on others through bonds of bio-
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task of evaluating the legal nature of the GATT/WTO, and setting
out the exact basis upon which it carries its authority. For international legal scholars to assume the rightness of the GATT/WTO
system does not relieve them of the burden of analysis-a type of
analysis which is taken for granted when it comes to other
branches of the law.
The Uruguay Round introduces areas of economic life into the
"ever-freer trade" system which were formerly the principal concern of national decision-makers. Whereas until 1995 the GATT
system mainly encompassed trade in goods, both manufactured
and primary, in 1995, with the adoption of the Uruguay Round
agreements, as well as the creation of the WTO, trade in services,
agriculture, and investments will begin to move forward according
to the same incrementalism that dismantled tariff barriers to
trade in goods around the world. Concurrently, national decision
makers will have less control over the outcome of trade disputes
within the GATT/WTO.
The GATT was set up after World War II with a number of national governments ostensibly agreeing to a principle of international trade through the lowering of tariffs.89 But in actuality, the
GATT members signed onto a process whereby trade was mandated to become freer and freer, and national economies increasingly interdependent. Under such a system, it appears that people are precluded from choosing just some trade bound by limits.
The many mainstream commentators currently engaged in the
trade and environment debate assume the ability of the GATT/
WTO to "generate wealth" that might be used to solve environ-

physical community. Whenever the abstracted-from elements of reality become too insistently evident in our experience, their existence is admitted by the category "exter-

nality." Externalities are ad hoc corrections introduced as needed to save appearances,
like the epicycles of Ptolemaic astronomy. Externalities do represent a recognition of
neglected aspects of concrete experience, but in such a way as to minimize restructuring of the basic theory. As long as externalities involve minor details, this is perhaps a

reasonable procedure. But when vital issues (e.g., the capacity of the earth to support

life) have to be classed as externalities, it is time to restructure basic concepts and

start with a different set of abstractions that can embrace what was previously
external.
Id. at 37.
89 See generally EDMUND JAN OSMANczYK, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNrrED NATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs 317-18 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining history and structure of

GATT).
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mental degradation.9 0 Similarly, they assume that the gains from
unlimited free trade are so great as to overwhelm any of trade's
negative effects.
This paper has presented a brief survey of the profoundly serious objections being raised to the ever-freer trade ethos. Such
concerns require an adequate response, and on a sufficiently
nuanced issue-by-issue basis.9 1 Without facing up to the question
of whether or not unlimited and ever-expanding international
trade is in fact altering the face of the natural and cultural environments forever, it hardly seems responsible for international
lawyers to simply continue to report on technical changes in the
GATT/WTO. It is long overdue to ask if the GATT/WTO, as an
institution representing such an extraordinary concentration of
economic power, ought to be allowed to continue to operate unchallenged as it subjects global natural resources, conditions of labor and employment, and cultural identities to the harsh winds of
"global competition." There is a grave danger to the environmental
movement in accepting a compromise alliance with the GATT/
WTO. The GATT/WTO will inevitably continue to consider the
fostering of increasingly liberalized trade as its highest priority.
It may well be that such an ever-liberalizing process in its turn
cannot be anything but inimical to the interests of the global
environment.

90 See, e.g., Bhagwati, supra note 12, at 43 (stating that growth enables governments to
tax and, therefore, to raise revenue for certain objectives, including abatement of pollution
and general protection of environment).
91 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 11-14 (1995). The authors appear to be answering the critics of free trade on a point
by point basis, but in fact are first simplifying the economic issues, and repeating most of
the standard arguments to be readily found in the mainstream trade law literature-thus
begging many of the questions anyway. Id. At least they acknowledge a scholarly responsibility to try and respond to serious objections that have been raised to unlimited free trade,
such as (i) that wages could be adversely affected by international competition; (ii) that
trade could lead to loss of cultural distinctiveness; and (iii) that a nation may experience a
loss of sovereignty as economies become increasingly interdependent. Id. at 11-14.

